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THE TRANSIENT AND THE PERMANENT IN 
ARBITRATION
William W Park*
He who would confine his thought to present time will not understand 
present reality. (Jules Michelet, 1798–1874)1
Several years ago, Jan Paulsson observed that Derek Roebuck might 
substitute for a time machine, providing a way for us to voyage backward 
with a guide to put everything in context.2 Indeed, the great Derek Roebuck, 
to whom we dedicate this set of essays, gave much of his professional life 
to making sure that by receiving a glimpse of dispute resolution in earlier 
times, we might have an opportunity better to understand the reality of 
present-day arbitration.3 
Arbitration’s history reminds many observers of the primordial Greek 
sea god Proteus, who could alter his shape at will, notwithstanding that 
his divine substance remained the same. Proteus reinvented himself by 
* Professor of Law, Boston University. General Editor, Arbitration International. Honorary 
Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge.
1. ‘Celui qui veut s’en tenir au présent, à l’actuel, ne comprendra pas l’actuel’. Introduction to 
Jules Michelet, Le Peuple (1846), at xvii. In his study of the French working class on the eve 
of the 1848 Revolution, Michelet recounts his own origins, assisting at his father’s printing 
press. According to the author, his origins of ‘The People’ led to a deeper understanding 
of their present condition. On that personal note, Michelet continues with the general 
observations about our need to go beyond present time in order to understand present reality.
2. Jan Paulsson, Book Review of Derek Roebuck, ‘The Golden Age of Arbitration: Dispute 
Resolution under Elizabeth I’, (2015) 31 Arbitration International 519. Paulsson wrote, ‘We 
do not have a time-traveling machine, but those of us who take an interest in the antecedents 
of modern arbitration have Derek Roebuck, and that is even better: not only a way to voyage 
back in time, but a guide who puts everything brilliantly in context.’ 
3. His studies include The Charitable Arbitrator: How to Mediate and Arbitrate in Louis 
XIV’s France (2002); Roman Arbitration, with Bruno de Loynes de Fumichon (2004); Early 
English Arbitration (2008); Ancient Greek Arbitration (2010); Disputes and Differences 
(2010); Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages: England 1154 to 1558 (2013); The 
Golden Age of Arbitration: Dispute Resolution Under Elizabeth I (2015); Arbitration and 
Mediation in Seventeenth-Century England; English Arbitration and Mediation in the Long 
Eighteenth Century, with Francis Calvert Boorman and Rhiannon Markless (2019). (All 
published Oxford: HOLO Books: The Arbitration Press.) 
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adapting to new circumstances, while remaining unchanged in essence. 
Likewise arbitration’s outward shape undergoes alterations when examined 
through the lens of the trappings of legal culture in each age. 
The essence of arbitration has remained remarkably unchanged over the 
years. Parties consent to binding dispute resolution pursuant to agreements 
that waive jurisdiction of otherwise competent courts, in favour of adju-
dication by decision-makers chosen, directly or indirectly, by protagonists 
of the relevant controversy. National judicial power may be invoked to 
recognise an arbitral award, or in some instances, to annul an award for 
gross procedural defects. The merits of the parties’ dispute, however, 
remain in the hands of the arbitrators.
This protean nature gives arbitration elements both transient and 
permanent,4 as illustrated by a long-standing problem: how to treat arbitra-
tion awards annulled under national statutes, but presented for enforcement 
in another country. The difficulty arises in the context of the proverbial 
‘regretted choice’ for merchants who agree to arbitrate but later (having 
lost their case) give way to second thoughts. 
Decades of divergent reactions to this conundrum provide a miniature 
time machine that might have delighted Derek. To illustrate, one might 
take a cross-border sales agreement subject to an arbitration clause, with 
an award made in England but presented for enforcement in Paris or 
New York. Most agree that freely accepted obligations generally deserve 
respect. If a buyer in the United States promises to pay $100 for goods 
imported from France, the purchaser should make payment absent some 
good reason. Who is to determine whether a ‘good reason’ does in fact 
exist? The American buyer might say the merchandise was defective. The 
French seller maintains the product was perfect. Does the matter go to 
courts of the United States or to courts of France? Or to some transnational 
body, such as an arbitral tribunal in London? 
In the search for a fair and certain forum, a common solution would be 
arbitration, at least for international transactions like the one above. To 
pursue matters further, let us assume the controversy goes to arbitration in 
London, as agreed to by both sides. The arbitral tribunal decides in favour 
of the French seller/exporter: the goods were indeed up to the contractually 
stipulated quality and the American buyer owes money for failing to pay. 
Let us posit further that, rightly or wrongly, an English court at the seat 
4.  The phrase ‘transient and permanent’ seems first to have appeared in a sermon by the New 
England preacher Theodore Parker, delivered at the ordination of Charles Shackford in the 
Hawes Place Church in Boston in May 1841. Theodore Parker, ‘The Transient and Permanent 
in Christianity’, in The Transient and Permanent in Christianity 447 (George Willis Cooke ed., 
1908), 447. An early Unitarian, Parker unsettled much of his community by suggesting that the 
message of Jesus was valuable solely because of the truth it revealed, not due to any divine 
credentials of the one who delivered the revelation.
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of the arbitration vacates the award due to violation of a provision of the 
English Arbitration Act.5 
When the French winner under the award (now annulled) seeks to have 
the award enforced by attaching the American company’s assets in New 
York and in Paris, those enforcement courts will need to decide whether 
to give effect to the arbitral award itself, which says that damages must 
be paid, or to the English court judgment setting aside the award, thus 
relieving the American buyer of its obligations pursuant to the arbitration. 
What is to be done? Award enforcement implicates one of the most 
successful instruments of international law: the 1958 United Nations 
(or ‘New York’) Convention,6 now signed by 166 States ranging from 
Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. The Convention provides for recognition of 
foreign arbitral awards, but with some significant caveats, in particular 
concerning awards annulled in their country of origin. These caveats have 
been applied differently by courts in France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Indeed, the Convention’s language has been applied differ-
ently even within the United States, with divergence derived not from any 
perversity of judges but from good faith variants in perspectives on how 
to construe the treaty. 
The battle plays itself out, in part, through Article V(1)(e) of the 
Convention, the application of which triggers different results depending 
on whether the word ‘may’ is read as conveying (a) permission, or (b) 
expectation, a matter that sometimes depends on the context of the case, or 
on which of the five official language versions gets consulted.7 
The English version of that provision reads: 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused [emphasis 
added], at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only 
if that party furnishes proof that … the award has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under 
the law of which, that award was made.8 
5. The 1996 Arbitration Act might permit annulment, for example, due to a perceived 
procedural irregularity as enumerated in section 68 of that Act. Or, an award in some 
instances may be set aside following an appeal under section 69 on a point of law, in this 
context defined by section 82 to include the law of England and Wales. 
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 
10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 330, no. 4739.
7. Convention Art XVI(1) says that the treaty’s Chinese, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish texts are ‘equally authentic’. On the comparison of treaty texts with different 
meanings, see Art 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, no. 18232, at 331, which provides for adoption of 
the ‘meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purposes of the 
treaty’.
8. The careful reader will note that the permissive ‘may’ in the English text of the Convention 
(‘recognition … may be refused’) leaves open more than one meaning. The verb ‘may’ could 
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By contrast, the French text lends itself to a more forceful interpretation 
that could mandate deference to the annulment court decision: 
La reconnaissance et l’exécution de la sentence ne seront refusées, sur 
requête de la partie contre laquelle elle est invoquée que si [unless] cette 
partie fournit la preuve que la sentence … a été annulée ou suspendue 
par une autorité compétente du pays dans lequel ou d’après la loi duquel 
la sentence a été rendu. 
The direct English translation of that French text would read as follows: 
‘Recognition and enforcement will not be refused … unless [que si] … the 
award was annulled or suspended by a competent authority of the country 
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.’ 
Absent from the French text is a notion of discretion in the recogni-
tion forum, conveyed by ‘may’ in English. Rather, the ‘unless’ [que si] 
combined with the future indicative tense (recognition will not be refused) 
normally compels an expectation of non-recognition of the annulled 
award.9 
Judges in the United States have taken a mixed approach, sometimes 
deferring to the judiciary at the arbitral seat, enforcing an annulled award,10 
while in other instances enforcing an award notwithstanding vacatur in 
contemplate equally viable options, as in ‘For dessert, you may choose vanilla ice cream 
or apple pie’. In the context of the Convention, however, the verb ‘may’ might hold a more 
forceful sense of expectation, as in ‘You may worship according to your own conscience.’ 
Indeed, the treaty context suggests an expectation of non-recognition if one considers the 
other listed items for which enforcement ‘may’ be refused as outlined in that Art V(1): refusal 
to recognise an award when there is no valid arbitration agreement, absent proper notice, if 
one side’s right to present its case has been denied, when an award goes beyond the scope of 
the arbitration clause, or when the parties’ agreement has been ignored in the composition 
of the arbitral tribunal. Would or should courts enforce awards not based on an agreement 
to arbitrate, or when one side was denied an opportunity to present its case? Reference to 
annulled awards sits squarely in the same coterie of grounds for non-recognition. 
9. The mandatory (or expectation) tone in such a future indicative construction might be 
illustrated in a sentence such as, ‘The scholarships will not be revoked unless (‘la bourse ne 
sera révoquée que si…’) the student is found guilty of cheating.’ On the ‘may’ versus ‘must’ 
debate in relation to New York Convention Art. V, see, for example, Georgios Petrochilos, ‘On 
the Mechanics and Rationale of Enforcing Awards Annulled in their State of Origin Under the 
New York Convention’, (1999) 48 Int’l & Comp. Law Q. 858; Richard W Hulbert, ‘Further 
Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and an Opportunity 
Foregone’, 13 ICSID Rev. 124, 144 (Spring 1998); Jan Paulsson, ‘May or Must Under the New 
York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics’, (1998) 14 Arb. Int’l 227.
10. See, for example, the US federal court decisions in the following cases: TermoRio S.A. 
v Electranta, 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (deferring to the annulment in Colombia of an 
award made in Bogotá); Baker Marine v Chevron, 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (deferring to 
the Nigerian court vacatur of an arbitral award made in Lagos); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) 
Co. v Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 864 F. 3d 172 (2d Cir.) (deferring to a 
Malaysian court judgment annulling an arbitral award made in Malaysia); Bechtel v Dubai, 
300 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2004) and 360 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing to enforce 
an award annulled for failure to administer an oath invoking God Almighty as required by 
UAE law, at a time when the UAE had not signed the New York Convention). 
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its country of origin.11 Much debate has focused on whether annulment 
should trigger universal effect, making an award unenforceable anywhere 
when presented for enforcement abroad where the losing side has assets, 
thus permitting a court at the place of arbitration to uproot an award once 
and for all.12
Notwithstanding the more forceful text in the French version of the 
New York Convention, jurists in France generally see the Convention as 
providing more leeway and discretion, with recognition of an annulled 
award proving the rule rather than the exception. French courts look to its 
Article VII, which provides that the treaty shall not deprive any interested 
party of a right to avail itself of an arbitral award in the manner allowed 
by the law where the award has been relied upon. The French judiciary 
thus gives effect to vacated awards under the national law of France, as 
enforcement forum. 
Shifts of emphasis to notions of ‘a-national’ arbitration and ‘interna-
tional lex mercatoria’ enter international disputes through national legal 
theory, espoused by French scholars such as Emmanuel Gaillard, Philippe 
Fouchard and Berthold Goldman.13 The Gallic view received its most 
classic expression in the Hilmarton case.14 
11. See Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral v Pemex–Exploración Y 
Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016). This Pemex decision recognised an award annulled at 
the seat in Mexico, pursuant to provisions of Mexican procedural law that had changed since 
the parties’ initial agreement to arbitrate. In Chromalloy v Egypt, 939 F.Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 
1996), an arbitral tribunal in Cairo gave damages to an American company for breach of a 
helicopter maintenance contract, in an award later vacated in Egypt for the tribunal’s alleged 
failure to apply the correct law. In the United States, where the losing side had assets, the 
American court reasoned that error of law did not constitute a ground for vacatur in the 
United States, thus permitting award enforcement. 
12. For some scholars, the New York Convention has been interpreted as containing an 
implicit understanding that the arbitral situs will monitor an arbitration’s procedural integrity, 
in exchange for which other countries will recognise awards that pass muster where rendered. 
See W. Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration 
113–120 (1992). See also Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Annulment of Awards in International 
Arbitration’, in R Lillich and C Brower, eds, International Arbitration in the 21st Century 
133 (1994); W Laurence Craig, ‘Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 30 Tex. Int’l Law J. 1.
13. See Philippe Fouchard, ‘La Portée internationale de l’annulation de la sentence arbitrale 
dans son pays d’origine’, 1997 Rev. Arb. 329; Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and 
Berthold Goldman, Traité de l’arbitrage commercial international (Paris: Editions LITEC, 
1996) ss. 270, 1595, 168789. For contrasting perspectives, see, for example, William W Park, 
‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Am. J. Int’l Law 805; William 
W Park, ‘Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration’, (1983) 32 Int’l & 
Comp. LQ 21; Jan Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When 
and Why It Matters,’ (1983) 32 Int’l & Comp. LQ 53; Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: 
Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin’, (1981) 30 Int’l & Comp. LQ 358; 
Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin’, (1999) 14 
ICSID Review (Foreign Investment Law J 16. 
14. Hilmarton v OTV, 1997 Rev. Arb. 376, note Ph. Fouchard; see, for example, Philippe 
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In the Hilmarton case, an arbitrator in Geneva had denied a claim for 
consulting fees to a consultant who had helped obtain a concession for 
drainage in Algiers, erroneously believing that the consultancy violated 
Switzerland’s public policy. While there was no allegation of bribery, 
the consultant’s activity purportedly offended an Algerian statute on 
commercial intermediaries. After a Swiss cantonal court vacated the award 
that had denied consultant’s fees, on the basis that the arbitrator made a 
mistake in understanding that statute,15 a new arbitral tribunal awarded 
damages to the consultant. 
In France, both awards were recognised, each in a separate proceeding: 
first, the annulled award in favour of the defendant which resisted payment 
of the fees,16 and then the award in the second arbitration in favour of the 
claimant consultant who won his fees.17 Ultimately, the French Cour de 
Cassation held that the res judicata effect of the first judgment, recognising 
the annulled arbitral award, prevented recognition of the second award.18 
Given the different interpretations of the Convention, and the intricacies of 
national law, an arbitral award annulled in its country of origin could be pre-
sented for enforcement against assets in other countries with dramatically 
different results. Courts purporting to apply the very same treaty to the very 
same facts may come to diametrically opposed conclusions.19
Fouchard, ‘La Portée internationale de l’annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son pays 
d’origine’, 1997 Rev. Arb. 329; Jean-François Poudret, ‘Quelle Solution Pour en Finir avec 
L’Affaire Hilmarton?’ 1998 Rev. Arb. 7 (1998); Eric Schwartz, ‘French Supreme Court 
Renders Final Judgment in the Hilmarton Case’, 1997 Int’l Arb. LR 45; Georges Delaume, 
‘Enforcement Against a Foreign State of an Arbitral Award Annulled in the Foreign State’, 
1997 (No. 2) Rev. droit des affaires int./Int’l Bus. LJ 253; Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral 
Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’, 9 ICC Bull. (May 1998), at 14. For 
an earlier decision along these lines, see Pabalk v Norsolor, Cour de Cassation, 9 Oct. 1984, 
1985 Rev. Arb. 431, note B. Goldman; (1985) 112 J. Dr. Int’l 679, note Ph. Kahn (award 
vacated in Austria enforceable in France). 
15. The award was rendered in August 1988 and thus subject to challenge for ‘arbitrariness’ 
under Art 36 of the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat. Upheld by the Swiss Tribunal 
fédéral,  the Geneva court  found that conflict with Algerian  legislation did not constitute a 
violation of Swiss public policy. See 1993 Rev. Arb. 315 (Court de Justice du Canton de 
Genève, 17 Nov. 1989), 322 (Tribunal fédéral, 17 Apr. 1990). For awards rendered from 
1989 onward, a different result would probably obtain under the Loi fédérale sur le droit 
internationale privé (LDIP).
16. Cour d’Appel de Paris, 1993 Rev. Arb. 300, relying on NCPC arts 1498, 1502, which do 
not include annulment where rendered as grounds for award non-recognition. The appellate 
court’s judgment was upheld by the Cour de cassation, 1994 Rev. Arb. 327, with commentary 
by Charles Jarrosson; English translation in 9 Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep., E-3 (May 1994); 20 
Y.B. Com. Arb. 663. See, for example, Vincent Heuzé, ‘La Morale, L’Arbitre et Le Juge’, 
1993 Rev. Arb. 179. 
17. The Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance recognised the second award in a decision 
confirmed by the Versailles Cour d’Appel, 29 June 1995, 1995 Rev. Arb. 639.
18. 10 June 1997, 1997 Rev. Arb. 376. 
19. For an interesting twist on competing views about the effect of arbitral awards rendered 
abroad, see Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov. 
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Some observers might roll their eyes at the different results derived 
from nuances in wording and legal framework, including various conno-
tations given to the verb ‘may’ in the English version of the New York 
Convention. Does justice and equity depend on such ‘technicalities’? For 
better or for worse, it seems so, at least at present. For those in the thick 
of the action, the buyer and the seller in a commercial transaction, justice 
and equity depend on precisely such parsing of language. The seller who 
wins the arbitration will say, ‘Where is the justice in denying the arbitra-
tors’ clear decision?’ The buyer who has obtained annulment of the award 
will retort, ‘Where is the equity in disregarding a ruling of the court?’ Each 
seeks justification in a treaty which may allow more than one response. 
General discussions of law take meaning only in concrete cases, some 
of which prove quite mundane, except to those whose welfare and fortunes 
remain in jeopardy. In the narrative set forth above, human rights include 
an entitlement to be paid (for the seller), just as State sovereignty (for 
the seller) implicates respect for the judicial decisions at the place of 
arbitration. 
Looking forward, the transient aspects of arbitration can be expected 
to continue their evolution. Different parts of the world provide divergent 
legal frameworks for cross-border dispute resolution, whether in respect of 
statutory grounds for award vacatur, or for recognition of awards annulled 
pursuant to those statutes. The substance of arbitration, however, retains its 
core of permanence, resting on agreements that the merits of a dispute will 
be adjudicated by decision-makers chosen by the parties. This interaction 
of the permanent and the transient will enrich scholars and practitioners 
with challenges that Derek would have delighted to share. 
of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763. The UK Supreme Court refused to enforce an ICC award 
made in Paris, in favour of a Saudi company, reasoning that under French law the Pakistani 
government was not bound by an arbitration agreement signed by a trust established by 
that government. A year later, however, a French court came to the opposite conclusion in 
rejecting an application to vacate the award in favour of the Saudi creditor, reasoning that the 
intervention in contract negotiations by officials of the Pakistani government meant that the 
State (not the trust) was in fact the true contracting party (‘la véritable partie pakistanaise lors 
de l’opération économique’). See Gouvernement du Pakistan contre Société Dallah, Cour 
d’appel de Paris, 1ère Chambre, 17 février 2011, no. d’inscription 09/28533.
